The"lessons learned" from the TMI-2 accident has resulted in expansion of the radiological monitoring requirements in and around nuclear power facilities.
Introduction and Background
The accident at the Three Mile Island Unit 2 Nuclear Power Plant on March 28, 1979 has had a profound effect on the nulcear industry and the regulatory considerations of the NRC. This accident has removed much of the complacency that has developed over the past two decades. This attitude was largely due to the excellent safety record of the nuclear industry and to the installation of redundant safety and instrument systems required in each plant.
TMI demonstrated that the man-machine interface was indeed fallible and that in the presence of apparently conflicting information safety systems could be overridden contributing to the severity of an accident. Two factors were evident that required corrective actions: 1) that nuclear power plant operators or operational staffs required additional training and, 2) additional instrumentation was required to give an operator information to enable him to take necessary preplanned actions, inform him of the status and function of safety systems and to determine the potential for breaching of safety barriers. If the safety barriers (fuel clad, primary system and containment integrity) are breached, the operator must have information regarding the release of radioactive materials to the environment.
Following the accident at TMI, the NRC established a Lessons Learned Task Force to identify and evaluate the safety concerns originating from the accident that require licensing considerations for present and future power reactors. These recommendations are contained in NUREG-0578, "TMI- An understanding of the nature of the release mechanism, pathway and radionuclides explains the problems that were encountered and thus many of the future monitoring requirements. The radionuclides released were transported to the auxiliary building via the primary coolant let-down, demineralizer flow. Degassing of the primary coolant occurred while in tanks in the auxiliary building. The gases leaked into the building where normal ventilation flow carried them throughout the building before exhausting to the environment through the installed filter systems. The problems encountered with the installed monitor systems were: 1) They were saturated by the quantity of noble gases released and were off scale.
2) The noble gases diffused or leaked into the annuler spaces in and around detector shields creating very high and continuing backgrounds.
3) The noble gases adsorbed on the installed inline radioiodine charcoal filter belt monitors and gave rise to the false indication that large quantities of radioiodine were being released. In addition to these stations, NRC is placing TLD's in two concentric rings around power plants, one inside the 2-3 mile ring and the other beyond the 5 mile monitor ring placed by the utility. However, the TLD's are after the fact instrumentation, useful for determining population exposure, but not for knowing or responding to accident conditions.
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Concl usion
The TMI-2 accident wil,l have many regulatory consequences that are far reaching and will be felt for some time to come. There were positive aspects to the TMI accident which are generally ignored in view of the desire for self-flagellation. Safety systems such as the containment building, containment sprays and emergency core cooling systems worked as designed. Operational defeat of some of these systems resulted inincreasing the severity of the accident.
Requirements upgrading effluent and environmental monitoring instrumentation is long overdue. The addition of expanded detection range, and I trust, better designed equipment is long overdue and will serve to better characterize effluents and perhaps inform the public that it is their health and safety that the NRC is attempting to protect. 
